Although several books or monographs on multiobjective optimization under uncertainty have been published, there seems to be no book which starts with an introductory chapter of linear programming and is designed to incorporate both fuzziness and randomness into multiobjective programming in a unified way. In this book, five major topics, linear programming, multiobjective programming, fuzzy programming, stochastic programming, and fuzzy stochastic programming, are presented in a comprehensive manner. Especially, the last four topics together comprise the main characteristics of this book, and special stress is placed on interactive decision making aspects of multiobjective programming for human-centered systems in most realistic situations under fuzziness and/or randomness. Organization of each chapter is briefly summarized as follows: Chapter 2 is a concise and condensed description of the theory of linear programming and its algorithms. Chapter 3 discusses fundamental notions and methods of multiobjective linear programming and concludes with interactive multiobjective linear programming. In Chapter 4, starting with clear explanations of fuzzy linear programming and fuzzy multiobjective linear programming, interactive fuzzy multiobjective linear programming is presented. Chapter 5 gives detailed explanations of fundamental notions and methods of stochastic programming including two-stage programming and chance constrained programming. Chapter 6 develops several interactive fuzzy programming approaches to multiobjective stochastic programming problems. Applications to purchase and transportation planning for food retailing are considered in Chapter 7. The book is self-contained because of the three appendices and answers to problems. Appendix A contains a brief summary of the topics from linear algebra. Pertinent results from nonlinear programming are summarized in Appendix B. Appendix C is a clear explanation of the Excel Solver, one of the easiest ways to solve optimization problems, through the use of simple examples of linear and nonlinear programming.

Although several books or monographs on multiobjective optimization under uncertainty have been published, there seems to be no book which starts with an introductory chapter of linear programming and is designed to incorporate both fuzziness and randomness into multiobjective programming in a unified way. In this book, five major topics, linear programming, multiobjective programming, fuzzy programming, stochastic programming, and fuzzy stochastic programming, are presented in a comprehensive manner. Especially, the last four topics together comprise the main characteristics of this book, and special stress is placed on interactive decision making aspects of multiobjective programming for human-centered systems in most realistic situations under fuzziness and/or randomness.

Organization of each chapter is briefly summarized as follows: Chapter 2 is a concise and condensed description of the theory of linear programming and its algorithms. Chapter 3 discusses fundamental notions and methods of multiobjective linear programming and concludes with interactive multiobjective linear programming. In Chapter 4, starting with clear explanations of fuzzy linear programming and fuzzy multiobjective linear programming, interactive fuzzy multiobjective linear programming is presented. Chapter 5 gives detailed explanations of fundamental notions and methods of stochastic programming including two-stage programming and chance constrained programming. Chapter 6 develops several interactive fuzzy programming approaches to multiobjective stochastic programming problems. Applications to purchase and transportation planning for food retailing are considered in Chapter 7.

The book is self-contained because of the three appendices and answers to problems. Appendix A contains a brief summary of the topics from linear algebra. Pertinent results from nonlinear programming are summarized in Appendix B. Appendix C is a clear explanation of the Excel Solver, one of the easiest ways to solve optimization problems, through the use of simple examples of linear and nonlinear programming.

Although studies on multiobjective mathematical programming under uncertainty have been accumulated and several books on multiobjective mathematical programming under uncertainty have been published (e.g., Stancu-Minasian (1984); Slowinski and Teghem (1990); Sakawa (1993); Lai and Hwang (1994); Sakawa (2000)), there seems to be no book which concerns both randomness of events related to environments and fuzziness of human judgments simultaneously in multiobjective decision making problems. In this book, the authors are concerned with introducing the latest advances in the field of multiobjective optimization under both fuzziness and randomness on the basis of the authors' continuing research works. Special stress is placed on interactive decision making aspects of fuzzy stochastic multiobjective programming for human-centered systems under uncertainty in most realistic situations when dealing with both fuzziness and randomness. Organization of each chapter is briefly summarized as follows: Chapter 2 is devoted to mathematical preliminaries, which will be used throughout the remainder of the book. Starting with basic notions and methods of multiobjective programming, interactive fuzzy multiobjective programming as well as fuzzy multiobjective programming is outlined. In Chapter 3, by considering the imprecision of decision maker's (DM's) judgment for stochastic objective functions and/or constraints in multiobjective problems, fuzzy multiobjective stochastic programming is developed. In Chapter 4, through the consideration of not only the randomness of parameters involved in objective functions and/or constraints but also the experts' ambiguous understanding of the realized values of the random parameters, multiobjective programming problems with fuzzy random variables are formulated. In Chapter 5, for resolving conflict of decision making problems in hierarchical managerial or public organizations where there exist two DMs who have different priorities in making decisions, two-level programming problems are discussed. Finally, Chapter 6 outlines some future research directions.

To derive rational and convincible solutions to practical decision making problems in complex and hierarchical human organizations, the decision making problems are formulated as relevant mathematical programming problems which are solved by developing optimization techniques so as to exploit characteristics or structural features of the formulated problems. In particular, for resolving con?ict in decision making in hierarchical managerial or public organizations, the multi level formula tion of the mathematical programming problems has been often employed together with the solution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium. However, weconceivethatapairoftheconventionalformulationandthesolution concept is not always suf?cient to cope with a large variety of decision making situations in actual hierarchical organizations. The following issues should be taken into consideration in expression and formulation of decision making problems. Informulationofmathematicalprogrammingproblems, itistacitlysupposedthat decisions are made by a single person while game theory deals with economic be havior of multiple decision makers with fully rational judgment. Because two level mathematical programming problems are interpreted as static Stackelberg games, multi level mathematical programming is relevant to noncooperative game theory; in conventional multi level mathematical programming models employing the so lution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium, it is assumed that there is no communi cation among decision makers, or they do not make any binding agreement even if there exists such communication. However, for decision making problems in such as decentralized large ?rms with divisional independence, it is quite natural to sup pose that there exists communication and some cooperative relationship among the decision maker

Although studies on multiobjective mathematical programming under uncertainty have been accumulated and several books on multiobjective mathematical programming under uncertainty have been published (e.g., Stancu-Minasian (1984); Slowinski and Teghem (1990); Sakawa (1993); Lai and Hwang (1994); Sakawa (2000)), there seems to be no book which concerns both randomness of events related to environments and fuzziness of human judgments simultaneously in multiobjective decision making problems. In this book, the authors are concerned with introducing the latest advances in the field of multiobjective optimization under both fuzziness and randomness on the basis of the authors' continuing research works. Special stress is placed on interactive decision making aspects of fuzzy stochastic multiobjective programming for human-centered systems under uncertainty in most realistic situations when dealing with both fuzziness and randomness. Organization of each chapter is briefly summarized as follows:

Chapter 2 is devoted to mathematical preliminaries, which will be used throughout the remainder

of the book. Starting with basic notions and methods of multiobjective programming, interactive

fuzzy multiobjective programming as well as fuzzy multiobjective programming is outlined.

In Chapter 3, by considering the imprecision of decision maker's (DM's) judgment for stochastic

objective functions and/or constraints in multiobjective problems, fuzzy multiobjective stochastic

programming is developed.

In Chapter 4, through the consideration of not only the randomness of parameters involved in

objective functions and/or constraints but also the experts' ambiguous understanding of the realized values of the random parameters, multiobjective programming problems with fuzzy random variables are formulated.

In Chapter 5, for resolving conflict of decision making problems in hierarchical managerial or

public organizations where there exist two DMs who have different priorities in making decisions, two-level programming problems are discussed.

Finally, Chapter 6 outlines some future research directions.

Decision makers in managerial and public organizations often encounter de cision problems under conflict or competition, because they select strategies independently or by mutual agreement and therefore their payoffs are then affected by the strategies of the other decision makers. Their interests do not always coincide and are at times even completely opposed. Competition or partial cooperation among decision makers should be considered as an essen tial part of the problem when we deal with the decision making problems in organizations which consist of decision makers with conflicting interests. Game theory has been dealing with such problems and its techniques have been used as powerful analytical tools in the resolution process of the decision problems. The publication of the great work by J. von Neumann and O. Morgen stern in 1944 attracted attention of many people and laid the foundation of game theory. We can see remarkable advances in the field of game theory for analysis of economic situations and a number of books in the field have been published in recent years. The aim of game theory is to specify the behavior of each player so as to optimize the interests of the player. It then recommends a set of solutions as strategies so that the actions chosen by each decision maker (player) lead to an outcome most profitable for himself or her self."

To derive rational and convincible solutions to practical decision making problems in complex and hierarchical human organizations, the decision making problems are formulated as relevant mathematical programming problems which are solved by developing optimization techniques so as to exploit characteristics or structural features of the formulated problems. In particular, for resolving con?ict in decision making in hierarchical managerial or public organizations, the multi level formula tion of the mathematical programming problems has been often employed together with the solution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium. However, weconceivethatapairoftheconventionalformulationandthesolution concept is not always suf?cient to cope with a large variety of decision making situations in actual hierarchical organizations. The following issues should be taken into consideration in expression and formulation of decision making problems. Informulationofmathematicalprogrammingproblems, itistacitlysupposedthat decisions are made by a single person while game theory deals with economic be havior of multiple decision makers with fully rational judgment. Because two level mathematical programming problems are interpreted as static Stackelberg games, multi level mathematical programming is relevant to noncooperative game theory; in conventional multi level mathematical programming models employing the so lution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium, it is assumed that there is no communi cation among decision makers, or they do not make any binding agreement even if there exists such communication. However, for decision making problems in such as decentralized large ?rms with divisional independence, it is quite natural to sup pose that there exists communication and some cooperative relationship among the decision maker

Decision makers in managerial and public organizations often encounter de cision problems under conflict or competition, because they select strategies independently or by mutual agreement and therefore their payoffs are then affected by the strategies of the other decision makers. Their interests do not always coincide and are at times even completely opposed. Competition or partial cooperation among decision makers should be considered as an essen tial part of the problem when we deal with the decision making problems in organizations which consist of decision makers with conflicting interests. Game theory has been dealing with such problems and its techniques have been used as powerful analytical tools in the resolution process of the decision problems. The publication of the great work by J. von Neumann and O. Morgen stern in 1944 attracted attention of many people and laid the foundation of game theory. We can see remarkable advances in the field of game theory for analysis of economic situations and a number of books in the field have been published in recent years. The aim of game theory is to specify the behavior of each player so as to optimize the interests of the player. It then recommends a set of solutions as strategies so that the actions chosen by each decision maker (player) lead to an outcome most profitable for himself or her self."